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Abstract
Predators may attack isolated or grouped prey in a cooperative, collective way. Whether a gregarious behavior is
advantageous to each species depends on several conditions and game theory is a useful tool to deal with such a problem.
We here extend the Lett-Auger-Gaillard model [Theor. Pop. Biol. 65, 263 (2004)] to spatially distributed populations
and compare the resulting behavior with their mean-field predictions for the coevolving densities of predator and prey
strategies. Besides its richer behavior in the presence of spatial organization, we also show that the coexistence phase in
which collective and individual strategies for each group are present is stable because of an effective, cyclic dominance
mechanism similar to a well-studied generalization of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game with four species, a further example
of how ubiquitous this coexistence mechanism is.
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1. Introduction
There are a myriad of foraging strategies that predators
utilize to increase their success rate. Among them, prey
may be attacked in a cooperative, coordinated way by a
group of predators employing similar spatially and tem-
porally correlated actions. When different and comple-
mentary behaviors are involved, it is also called a collab-
oration [1]. Examples of animals that exhibit coordinated
or collaborative hunting include lions [2–4] (also the pair
of man-eater lions of Tsavo [5]), hawks [6], crocodiles [7],
spiders [8, 9], ants [10], and several other species [1]. Inter-
species collaborations exist as well, for example, between
fishermen and dolphins in the south of Brazil [11, 12],
honey hunter men and honeyguide birds [13, 14], coyotes
and badgers [15], among others [16]. Hunting in groups
may bring several benefits and has been widely discussed
(for a review, see Ref. [1] and references therein). For
example, it increases the probability of capturing large
prey [6, 10, 17, 18], helps prevent the carcass from be-
ing stolen by other predators [19, 20], allows for faster
food location [21] and more complex distracting, track-
ing and chasing tactics, helps related conspecifics that
may be unable to hunt or are in the process of acquir-
ing hunting skills [18, 22], etc. On the other hand, there
may be setbacks as it also increases the competition be-
tween members of the group while feeding, concentrates
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the search for food to a smaller territory that may de-
crease the availability of prey, etc. Collective tactics may
also benefit prey [23]. Surveillance is more efficient when
done in parallel by several individuals while others have
more time to feed themselves [24–26]. The probability of
being caught is smaller [27, 28] and the group may take
advantage of group distracting [29], intimidating and es-
caping techniques. Conversely, a group of prey may be
more easily spotted than an individual and the resources
should be shared by all members [30, 31]. In addition to
those factors, for both prey and predators, collective deci-
sion making can be improved in larger groups [32, 33] (but
information sharing may involve costs [34] and benefits [35]
as well).
Despite mounting experimental results, much less atten-
tion has been dedicated to model coordinate hunting [36].
Over a decade ago, Lett et al [37] introduced a game the-
oretical model, hereafter referred to as the LAG model, in
which the abundance of prey and predators were assumed
constant and only the fractions of each populations using
either an individual or a collective strategy coevolved (see,
however, Ref. [38]). The LAG model takes into account
some of the advantages and disadvantages for both prey
and predators choosing a grouping strategy. More specifi-
cally, it is assumed that grouping lowers the risk of being
preyed at the cost of increasing the competition for re-
sources, while predators have a greater probability of suc-
cess at the expense of having to share the prey with others,
sometimes referred to as the “many-eyes, many mouths”
trade-off [30, 31]. Prey and predators were modeled by
assuming a fully mixed (no spatial structure), mean-field
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approach, and the temporal evolution of both densities
being described by replicator equations [39].
A complementary approach, based on a less coarse
grained description, explicitly considers the spatial distri-
bution of individuals and groups. The local interactions
between them introduce correlations that may translate
into spatial organization favoring either grouping or iso-
lated strategies, raising a number of questions. For in-
stance, do these strategies coexist within predators or prey
populations? If yes, is this coexistence asymptotically sta-
ble? How does the existence of a local group induce or
prevent grouping behavior on neighboring individuals? Do
gregarious individuals segregate, forming extended regions
dominated by groups? In other words, how spatially het-
erogeneous is the system? Does the replicator equation
provide a good description for both the dynamics and the
asymptotic state? If not, when does it fail? If many strate-
gies persist, which is the underlying mechanism that sus-
tains coexistence? We try to answer some of these ques-
tions with a version of the LAG model in which space is ex-
plicitly taken into account through a square lattice whose
sites represent a small sub-population. Each of the sites
is large enough to contain only a single group of predators
and prey at the same time. If any of these groups is ever
disrupted, their members will resort to a solitary strategy,
hunting or defending themselves alone.
The paper is organized as follows. We first review, in
Section 2.1, the LAG model [37] and summarize the main
results obtained with the replicator equation, and then
describe, in Section 2.2, the agent based implementation
with local competition. The results obtained in the spatial
framework are presented in Sec. 3. Finally, we discuss our
conclusions in Section 4.
2. The Model
2.1. Replicator Equations
Lett et al [37] considered, within a game theoretical
framework, grouping strategies for prey and predators.
Both can choose between single and collective behavior
and each choice involves gains and losses for the individ-
uals, as discussed in the introduction. The relevant pa-
rameters of the model are defined in Table 1. The size of
both populations is kept constant during the evolution of
the system; only the proportion of cooperative predators,
x(t), and the fraction of gregarious prey, y(t), evolve in
time (see, however, Ref. [38] for a version that also consid-
ers population dynamics). Variations depend on how the
subpopulation’s payoff compares with the average payoff
of the respective population. If collective behavior leads
to a larger payoff than the average, the associated density
increases, otherwise it decreases. This dynamics is then
described by the replicator equations [39].
For the fraction x of predators hunting collectively, the
payoff is [37]
Px =
eαpG
n
y +
pG
n
(1− y).
Definition and default value
p probability of a predator in a group capturing a lone
prey (0.5)
G gain per captured prey per unit of time (1)
n number of predators in a group (3)
e number of prey captured by a group of predators (2)
α preying efficiency reduction due to grouped prey
β preying efficiency reduction when hunting alone
γ reduction of prey resources due to aggregation (1)
F gain for isolated prey per unit of time (1)
Table 1: Model parameters [37] along with the default value consid-
ered here.
The first contribution comes from the interaction of these
predators with the fraction y of prey that organize into
groups for defense. By better defending themselves, prey
reduce the hunting efficiency by a factor 0 ≤ α < 1;
nonetheless, e prey are captured with probability p and
the gain G per prey is shared among the n members in the
group of predators. The second term is the gain when the
group attacks an isolated prey, whose density is 1− y, and
shares it among the n predators as well. When the remain-
ing 1−x predators hunt solely, they are limited to a single
prey and an efficiency that is further reduced by a factor
0 ≤ β < 1, what is somehow compensated by not having
to share with others. This information is summarized in
the payoff matrix:
A =
(
eαpG/n pG/n
αβpG βpG
)
. (1)
As isolated prey consume the available resources, the gain
per unit time is, on average, F . Once aggregated, the
resources are shared and the individual gain reduced by
a factor 0 ≤ γ < 1. The fraction of prey that aggregates
becomes less prone to be preyed on by a factor α. If the
grouped prey are attacked by a group of predators, e prey
are captured and Lett et al [37] considered that the payoff
coefficient is 1 − eαp (imposing eαp ≤ 1). On the other
hand, a lone predator has its efficiency reduced by a factor
β, thus the surviving probability is 1−βp or 1−αβp for an
individual or a group of prey, respectively. The payoff for
the fraction y of prey that remain grouped is then written
as
Py = (1 − eαp)γFx+ (1− αβp)γF (1 − x).
A similar consideration can be done for isolated prey [37],
whose payoff matrix is
B =
(
(1− eαp)γF (1− αβp)γF
(1− p)F (1 − βp)F
)
. (2)
It is the difference between the payoff P and its average,
P , that drives the evolution of both x and y. Indeed, the
replicator equations, x˙ = x(Px − Px) and y˙ = y(Py − Py),
which give the rate at which these two densities evolve in
2
time, are [37]
x˙
x
= (1 0)A
(
y
1− y
)
− (x 1− x)A
(
y
1− y
)
y˙
y
= (1 0)B
(
x
1− x
)
− (y 1− y)B
(
x
1− x
)
.
(3)
These equations describe an asymmetric game and can
be rewritten as [39]:
x˙ = x(1 − x)[α12(1− y)− α21y]
y˙ = y(1− y)[β12(1− x)− β21x],
(4)
where
α12 = −p(β − 1/n)G
α21 = αp(β − e/n)G
β12 = [γ − 1 + βp(1− αγ)]F
β21 = [1− γ − p(1− eαγ)]F.
(5)
Eqs. (4) have five fixed points: the vertices of the unit
square, where x(1−x) = y(1−y) = 0, and the coexistence
state:
x∗ =
β12
β12 + β21
y∗ =
α12
α12 + α21
.
(6)
We will use the notation 01, 11, 10 and 00 either for the
asymptotic state of the whole system, i.e., x∞y∞ with
x∞ ≡ x(t → ∞) and y∞ ≡ y(t → ∞) or, in the spatial
version to be discussed in Section 2.2, for the site vari-
able describing the combined state of site i, xiyi. The
asymptotic state is determined only by the signs of α12,
α21, β12 and β21, as discussed in Refs. [37, 39] and sum-
marized here. Indeed, if α12α21 < 0 or β12β21 < 0, the
densities of grouped predators x and grouped prey y will
monotonically converge to an absorbent state in which at
least one of the populations is grouped, i.e, 01, 10 or 11.
On the other hand, if α12α21 > 0 and β12β21 > 0, there
are two different possibilities. From the linear stability
analysis [37, 39], (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point if α12β12 > 0,
and the system ends up in one of the vertices of the unit
square (for the choice of the parameters considered here,
see below, this does not occur). On the other hand, if
α12β12 < 0, the eigenvalues are imaginary and the system
evolves along closed orbits around the center (x∗, y∗). In
other words, when this last condition is obeyed, based on
a linear stability analysis, both strategies, grouped or not,
coexist at all times with oscillating fractions of the popula-
tion and their time averaged values, once in the stationary
regime, correspond to Eqs. (6).
The above replicator equations predict that both x and
y approach the asymptotic state 1 or 0 exponentially fast
(except in the coexistence phase). Consider, for instance,
phase 11. As discussed below, y attains the asymptotic
state much faster than x. Then, taking y = 1 and expand-
ing for small 1 − x, we get x(t) ∝ 1 − exp(−α21t). The
characteristic time is τ = α−121 and as β → e/n, τ diverges
as τ ∼ (βn − e)−1. Different transitions may depend on
other coefficients, Eqs. (5), but the exponent of τ at the
transition is always 1.
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Figure 1: Mean-field phase diagram obtained in Ref. [37], showing
the 11, 01, 10 and coexistence phases. The vertical transition line
is at α = 1/2 for 0 ≤ β ≤ 2/3 while there is a horizontal line at
β = 2/3, ∀α, and another one at β = 1/3 for α ≥ 1/2. Notice that
a coexistence phase replaces phase 00.
Besides presenting general results, Lett et al [37] also
discussed the particular case when there is no reduction
in resource intake by the prey when they are grouped
(γ = 1). In this case, their behavior is a response to the
capture rate alone. Considering the values listed in Ta-
ble 1 for the several model parameters (F = G = γ = 1,
p = 1/2, n = 3 and e = 2), we see that while β12 is al-
ways positive, β21, α12 and α21 change signs at 2α = 1,
3β = 1 and 3β = 2, respectively. These changes in sign
lead to different asymptotic behaviors (phases) and locate
the transition lines between them, as can be seen in the
mean-field phase diagram of Fig. 1. As expected, prey are
grouped when α is small, whatever the value of β. Simi-
larly, small values of β lead to cooperating predators for
all values of α. Remarkably, instead of a 00 phase in which
neither species form groups, there is a coexistence phase
where the densities of grouped animals oscillate in time
along closed orbits around the center point (x∗, y∗) given
by Eq. (6). This occurs for 2α > 1 and intermediate values
1 < 3β < 2, where the eigenvalues of the Jacobian associ-
ated with Eqs. (4) become purely imaginary (α12β12 < 0,
as discussed in Refs. [37, 39]).
2.2. Spatially Distributed Population
The above description of the competition between col-
lective and individual strategies for both predators and
prey does not take into account possible spatial correla-
tions and geometrical effects. Space is usually introduced
by considering an agent based model in which individu-
als are placed on a lattice or distributed on a continuous
3
region. We consider the former case with a unit cell cor-
responding to the size of the territory of the smallest vi-
able group. Since both predators and prey coexist in each
site, there are two variables (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , N (where
N = L2 is the total number of sites and L is the linear
length of the square lattice) that take only the values 1 or
0; the former when agents are grouped, the latter for inde-
pendent individuals. Thus, the global quantities x(t) and
y(t) now correspond to the fraction of sites having xi = 1
and yi = 1, respectively.
Differently from the mean-field description where pay-
off was gained from interactions with all individuals in the
system, in the lattice version, interactions are local and
occur only between nearest neighbor sites (self-interaction
is also considered since each site has both predators and
prey). At each step of the simulation, one site (i) and
one of its neighbors (j) are randomly chosen. The preda-
tors (prey) on i interact with the prey (predators) both
on i and in the four nearest neighboring sites, accumulat-
ing the payoff P
(i)
x (P
(i)
y ). At the same time, both groups
in j accumulate their payoffs as well. If more efficient,
the strategies of site j are adopted with a probability pro-
portional to the difference of payoffs. For predators (and
analogously for prey), this probability is
Prob(xi ← xj) = max
[
P
(j)
x − P
(i)
x
Pmaxx
, 0
]
, (7)
where Pmaxx is the maximum value of the accumulated pay-
off of the predators for the chosen parameters. This rule is
known to recover the replicator equation when going from
the microscopic, agent based scale to the macroscopic,
coarse grained level [40]. After N such attempts, time
is updated by one unit (one Monte Carlo step, MCS). In
Ref. [41], where some preliminary results were presented,
we considered a slightly different dynamics in which the
two chosen neighbors compare their payoff and that earn-
ing the smallest one adopted the strategy of the winner
(with the above probability). The difference is that, in
Ref. [41], either i or j would change strategy, while here,
only i may be updated.
Notice that because the level of spatial description is still
larger than the individual scale, as a first approximation
we take the limit of high population viscosity, neglecting
the motion of individuals and groups across different sites.
In this case, strategies only propagate by the limited dis-
persal introduced by the above reproduction (or imitation)
rule. We further discuss this point in the conclusions. We
now present our results for the spatial version of the LAG
model and, when possible, compare with the mean-field
predictions.
3. Results
Fig. 2 shows the temporal evolution of both x(t) and
y(t) for α = 0.2, several values of 0 < β < 1 and an
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Figure 2: Behavior of both the fraction of predators hunting in
groups, x(t), and prey defending themselves collectively, y(t), as a
function of time on a single run with α = 0.2, L = 100 and several
values of β. The transition from collectively hunting predators to
single, individual hunters occurs at β = e/n = 2/3. Notice that
most of the prey are in the aggregated state at all times, with y(t)
monotonically increasing from y(0) = 0.5 to y(∞) = 1. Predators,
on the other hand, have a richer behavior (see text). As β → 2/3,
from both sides, a plateau at x ≃ 0.26 develops (the dashed, horizon-
tal line is only a guide to the eyes). Inset: Power-law behavior of the
characteristic time τ such that |x− x∞| < 0.2 around the transition
at β = 2/3. The straight lines have exponent 1, as predicted by the
replicator equation, although the coefficients differ by one order of
magnitude. The top curve is for β → 2/3− while the bottom one is
for β → 2/3+.
initial state with x(0) = y(0) = 1/2. In this case, for
all values of β, prey remain mostly grouped at all times
since y(t) > 0.5 (bottom panel). As predicted in mean-
field, there is a transition at β = 2/3 where predators
change strategy (top panel): for β > 2/3, hunting alone
becomes more efficient and x∞ = 0. On the other hand,
when the cost of sharing the prey is compensated by more
efficient preying, β < 2/3, we have x∞ = 1. Interestingly,
for the initial state chosen here, the behavior of x(t) is not
monotonic when (1+2α)/3(1+α) < β < 2/3: x(t) initially
decreases, x˙(0) < 0, attaining a minimum value and then
resumes the increase towards x∞ = 1. The location of
this minimum corresponds to the time at which y crosses
the point y∗, and the envelope of all minima follows the
plateau developed for β > 2/3 as this value is approached
from above. In this latter region, the behavior follows
a two-step curve: there is a first, fast approach to the
plateau followed by the departure from it at a much longer
timescale. In this model, the fast relaxations occur as prey
organize themselves into groups (increasing y) while the
later slow relaxation is a property of the predators alone
and is caused by the orbit passing near an unstable fixed
point, as can be understood from Eqs. (4). For values of
α in the interval (1 + 2α)/3(1 + α) < β < 2/3, if y <
y∗, x decreases until y crosses the line at y∗, whose value
depends on both α and β. At this point, the coefficient
of x˙ is zero and there is a minimum. Once y > y∗, x
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resumes the increase and approaches the asymptotic state
x∞ = 1 exponentially fast. As β → 2/3
−, y∗ → 1 and
the minimum crosses over to an inflection point. Indeed,
for β > 2/3, x(t) decreases towards 0 after it crosses the
plateau. This behavior is seen both in simulations and in
mean-field.
Associated with the late exponential regime there is
a characteristic time that diverges as a phase transition
is approached. For example, in mean-field, τ ∼ α−121 ∼
(βn− e)−1 for the 11-01 transition. In the simulations, as
x approaches the limiting value x∞, τ is estimated as the
time beyond which |x−x∞| < ǫ, where 0 < ǫ < 1 is chosen,
for convenience, to be ǫ = 0.2. The exponent measured in
the simulations is in agreement with the mean-field pre-
diction, as can be seen in the inset of Fig. 2.
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Figure 3: The same as in Fig. 2 but for α = 0.8. Two transitions are
present at β = 1/n = 1/3 and e/n = 2/3, with a coexistence phase
in between where both x∞ and y∞ attain a plateau.
Differently from the α = 0.2 case, for α = 0.8 there
is, in agreement with the replicator equation, a coexis-
tence phase where both strategies may persistently coex-
ist. Fig. 3 shows that, depending on α and β, there is an
initial, transient regime in which both x and y oscillate,
getting very close to the absorbing states. Because of the
stochastic nature of the finite system, it may eventually
end in one of those absorbing states during the oscillating
regime (although the required time may be exponentially
large, see later discussion), otherwise the amplitude of the
oscillations decreases and a mixed fixed point is attained.
A natural question is how close this fixed point is to the
mean-field prediction, Eqs. (4). Since it is the intermediate
region in which coexistence may occur that presents new,
non trivial behavior, we now discuss it in more detail.
The mean-field monotonic behavior can be observed in
the solid lines of Fig. 4 as the system enters the coexistence
region at a fixed β = 0.4 from the 11 phase. While mean-
field predicts that x∞ and y∞ present a continuous and
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Figure 4: Average asymptotic value of the fraction of predators hunt-
ing in group, x(t) (top), and prey defending themselves in group, y(t)
(bottom), for β = 0.4, as a function of α. The solid lines correspond
to the fixed points, Eqs. (6), predicted in mean-field and discussed
in Sec. 2.1. Notice that the transition from the 11 phase to the coex-
istence one is continuous for both quantities and occurs at a smaller
value of α than predicted in mean-field, αc ≃ 0.45. At a larger,
size dependent value of α there is a transition to the 01 phase. As
the system size L increases, the coexistence phase becomes broader.
Averages are over 10 samples.
discontinuous transition, respectively, at αMFc = 0.5, when
predators and prey are spatially distributed, the simula-
tion shows, instead, continuous transitions for both quan-
tities at a smaller value, αc ≃ 0.45. This is not due to
finite size effects since the curves, for the broad range of
system sizes considered here, collapse onto a single curve
in this region, and the larger the system is, the wider the
collapsed region becomes. The simulation results on the
lattice disagree with the mean-field predictions both quan-
titative and qualitatively. In the spatial model, instead of
a monotonic decay, y∞ has a minimum at α ≃ 0.59 for
β = 0.4, even in the limit of very large systems. The ex-
istence of this minimum is remarkable because one would
expect that as α increases, predators become more efficient
against grouped prey and the fraction of the latter would
decrease. Moreover, both x∞ and y∞ present strong fi-
nite size effects in this phase. Above a size dependent
value of α, x is absorbed onto the group disrupted state
(x∞ = 0) and, immediately after, y∞ evolves toward 1.
Fig. 5 also shows the behavior of x∞ and y∞, but for a
fixed value of α. In the interval 1/3 < β < 2/3, coming
from the 10 phase, the system first goes through the 00
and 01 phases (the former is not present in the mean-field
case), before crossing the wider coexistence region. Then
it crosses region 11 and eventually arrives again at the
01 phase when β = 2/3. All these behaviors and transi-
tions are summarized in the phase diagram of Fig. 6, for
L = 100. The coexistence region, that is reentrant and ex-
ists also for α < 1/2, increases with the system size (as can
be observed in Figs. 4 and 5). The small regions shrink for
increasing L, but the convergence to the L→∞ behavior
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Figure 5: The same as Fig. 4 but with α = 0.8 and β as the variable.
Averages are over 10-20 samples, depending on the size.
(e.g., whether 00 and 10 phases completely disappear or
not), is very slow. A more detailed analysis can be done
(see Refs. [42–44] and references therein) by measuring the
time it takes for the coexistence state to be absorbed into
one of the homogeneous states (what eventually will occur
for a finite system because of the stochastic nature of the
dynamics) and how it depends on L. Indeed, inside the
coexistence region, this characteristic time increases ex-
ponentially with the system size while it is much smaller
(logarithmically) for the other phases.
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Figure 6: Zoomed in phase diagram, obtained with L = 100, showing
the rich behavior when agents are spatially distributed (compare with
the pure coexistence phase existing in the region 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
1/3 ≤ β ≤ 2/3 in the mean-field diagram, Fig. 1). As L increases,
the coexistence region gets bigger while the phases around it shrink
(in particular the small ones like 10 and 00). Whether they disappear
or remain very small when L→∞ is not clear.
In the coexistence phase, any of the four combinations
of lone and collective strategies for both predators and
prey may be present at each site (xiyi): 00, 01, 10 and 11.
Fig. 7 shows, for β = 0.5 and different values of α, how
00 10 01 11
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Snapshots using a color code for the combined xiyi strategy
for β = 0.5 and α = 0.6 (left), 0.7 (middle) and 0.8 (right), all inside
the coexistence phase, at t = 213 MCS and on an L = 200 lattice.
Notice that the strategies organize in intertwined domains, whose
characteristic size depends on α and β. In this case, both 00 and 01
increases as the system approaches the border with the 01 phase.
these four strategies organize into domains whose sizes de-
pend on both α and β. While the coexistence persists,
the four strategies survive by spatially organizing them-
selves in nested domains whose borders move, invading
other domains in a cyclic way. In Fig. 8a we show the
direction of these invasions by placing, in the initial state
(t = 0, top row), one strategy inside, and another outside
a circular patch (a flat interface would do as well). The
bottom row shows the corresponding state after 40 Monte
Carlo steps. By swapping positions, the invasion direction
is reversed, indicating that it is not a simple curvature
driven dynamics but, instead, involves a domination rela-
tion. Taking into account the six combinations of Fig. 8a,
the interaction graph shown in Fig. 8b summarizes how
the different strategies interact (this particular orientation
of the arrows may change for other points in the coexis-
tence phase [41]). Similar cyclic dominance behavior has
been extensively studied in predator-prey models with in-
teraction graphs with three (Rock-Paper-Scissors) or more
species [40, 45] with intransitive (sub-)loops. Indeed, the
topology of the interaction graph in Fig. 8b is closely re-
lated to the one in Ref. [44]. The invasion is either direct
as in the first four columns (or, equivalently, along the
perimeter of the interaction graph) or, as seen in the last
two columns, involves the creation of an intermediate do-
main. For example, a patch of 00s invades 11 (fifth column
in Fig. 8a) by first disrupting the prey organization. The
strategy 10 thus created, invades 11 and, in turn, is in-
vaded by 00. In those cases that the invasion proceeds
through an intermediate domain (strategies along the di-
agonal of Fig. 8b are not neutral), we use a dashed arrow
in the interaction graph. This cyclic dominance among the
combined strategies of prey and predators is the mecha-
nism underlying the persistence of the coexistence state in
this region of the phase diagram.
While the solid lines shown in the interaction graph of
Fig. 8b are valid under broader conditions, the diagonal,
dashed ones are not. For example, if only 00 and 10 sites
are present (Fig. 8a, first column), prey will never change
to a collective strategy (11 and 01 sites will not appear).
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Figure 8: a) Strategy dominance for β = 0.4 and α = 0.7 starting from an initial, circular patch (top row) and evolving for 40 MCS (bottom
row). In some cases, denoted by the solid arrows in the graph at the right, the initial patch increases in size. For the interactions along the
diagonal (dashed arrows), the invasion occurs in two steps. For example (fifth column), 00 first disrupts the aggregated prey, forming an
intermediate 10 cluster, and then grows into it. Notice that for the 10 invading 01 (last column), besides the strategy 11 that intermediates
the invasion, there are some groups of 00 growing inside the 10 patch (at the interface 01-10, all combinations may be created and, sometimes,
migrate toward the interior of the circle). b) Interaction graph showing the direction of the invasion front for each of the four strategies.
Only predators may change strategy in this case and be-
cause they earn their payoffs from isolated prey, this is easy
to evaluate and does not depend on the specific geometry
of either the lattice or the initial configuration. Indeed, for
a 00 site comparing its payoff with a 10 neighbor, while the
former earns 5β/2, the latter receives 5/6. The 00 strat-
egy will then invade the 10 population if β > 1/3. If we
repeat this analysis for the first four columns of Fig. 8a,
we get: 10 invades 11 if α > 1/2, 11 invades 01 if β < 2/3
and, finally, 01 invades 00 if α < 1. These are the inter-
actions around the graph of Fig. 8b, represented by solid
lines. Thus, as expected, by changing the values of α and
β, the arrows may change orientation as well. Indeed, the
possible combinations of these arrows agree with the re-
gions shown in the mean-field phase diagram of Fig. 1. In
particular, the one with α > 1/2 and 1/3 < β < 2/3 is
where the four arrows are clockwise oriented, dominance
is cyclic and coexistence may ensue. Diagonal interactions
are much more complex. All four states may now be cre-
ated from initial states with only 00 and 11 (or 10 and 01)
and the earned payoffs depend on the number of neighbors
having each strategy, what changes from site to site and
evolves in time, leading to the rich phase diagram inside
the coexistence region, shown in Fig. 6. Indeed, it is im-
portant to emphasize that the invasion graph in Fig. 8b
was obtained for the particular values β = 0.4 and α = 0.7
within that time window. Other points inside the coexis-
tence phase may show similar behavior albeit with some
arrows reversed and strategies switching roles while keep-
ing some of the sub-loops intransitive and the coexistence
stable [41]. An intriguing characteristic of the phase dia-
gram, Fig. 6, is that the coexistence phase is surrounded
by several smaller phases, absent in that region within
mean-field. This behavior can be better understood ob-
serving the patterns in Fig. 7. In that case, as α increases
and β is kept fixed, i.e., one approaches the frontier with
the 01 phase, the densities of both 00 and 01 strategies
increase (remember that 01, as shown in Fig. 8b, prey on
00). There is, for a given size L, a value of α where those
domains are comparable to L and it seems that this finite
size effect triggers the transition, originating the strong
dependence of its location on L. If we move toward the
other phases, a similar behavior occurs, with the dominant
strategy of the approaching phase increasing in density.
The important point is that, as the system increases, the
coexistence phase becomes larger and the other phases de-
crease in size. Whether this trend eventually leads to a
coexistence phase occupying the whole region is an open
question, beyond our current computational capabilities.
4. Conclusions and discussion
The foraging behavior of predators and the correspond-
ing defensive response from prey is fundamental to under-
stand how small, spatially distributed animal communities
organize and eventually engage in more complex forms of
sociability [46–48]. It thus becomes important, when mod-
eling such behavior, to go beyond mean-field where a fully
mixed, infinite size system is considered and the spatial
structure, with the correlations it implies, is missing. We
considered here a finite dimensional stochastic version of
the model introduced by Lett et al [37] in which short
range interactions between predators and prey are taken
into account. In this way, local spatial correlations that
change, to some extent, the foraging behavior predicted
by the replicator (mean-field) equation, and the accompa-
nying new dynamical behavior are introduced. The game
theoretical framework in this model considers two strate-
gies, collective or individual, for both hunting predators
and defensive prey. The advantages and disadvantages
of each option are modeled by a set of independent pa-
rameters from which we considered variations in only two:
how the probability p of a group of predators capturing a
lone prey is reduced when prey are grouped (αp) or when
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the predators hunt alone (βp). We then study in detail
this particular case, discussed only within mean-field in
Ref. [37], in the limit of high population viscosity in which
strategy dispersion is a slow process, solely occurring due
to the newborn limited dispersal driven by the pairwise
updating rule between nearest neighbors patches.
The combined strategies of both predators and prey
present four possible states in our binary version. There
are three phases with either prey or predators (or both) be-
having collectively (10, 01 and 11), while in the 00 phase
there are no groups. Results from extensive simulations
on the square lattice confirm part of the mean-field phase
diagram, with a richer structure around the coexistence
phase. More importantly, our results unveil the under-
lying mechanism for the coexistence of these strategies.
Specifically, in this phase, this model is an example of an
asymmetric game presenting cyclic dominance between the
above four combined strategies. Starting, say, with a pop-
ulation of collective predators preying on lone individuals
(i.e., most of the sites are 10 while the other strategies,
albeit present, have small densities), free riders have the
advantage of not having to share their prey with the other
members of the group and the 00 strategy invades 10. At
this point, if prey organizes into groups they may better
defend themselves, and thus 01 replaces 00. Finally, the
lone predators get better off preying collectively and 11
dominates 01. Finally, 10 invades 11 because it is better
for predators to go after grouped prey, since the number
of captured prey (e) compensates for the loss of efficiency
(α). Thus, it is better for aggregated prey to stay alone.
The strategies 11, 01, 11 and 00 form spatially extended
domains whose borders are not static and move accord-
ingly with the interaction graph (e.g., Fig. 8b).
Besides considering simple models for this less explored
foraging variability, our results emphasize the importance
of studying both the asymptotic states and the dynam-
ics towards them in a finite size population. It is not
possible to disentangle the strong finite size effects ob-
served in the asymptotic state of the stochastic model
from the dynamical evolution since it is the very exis-
tence of orbits that, by closely approaching the absorbing
states, makes the system prone to be captured by them
as a consequence of fluctuations. Since actual populations
are far from the thermodynamical limit (infinite popula-
tion), the results obtained for intermediate sizes become
relevant. Timescales may be very large and the transient
coexistence may extend to times much larger than those
that are relevant in practice. Moreover, the differences
between the mean-field and the spatial version show the
importance of trying several complementary approaches
even when studying quite simplified models. In our simu-
lations, the microscopic updating rule, Eq. (7), is applied
to one site i chosen at random, i.e., both xi and yi may be
updated in each single step. We checked that the results
are essentially the same when they are independently cho-
sen or, as in Ref. [41], when either i or j change at any
given attempt. In this regard, it would be important to
further check how robust the results are when also chang-
ing the updating rule, replacing Eq. (7) by, for example,
the Fermi rule (see Ref. [40] for a review on the several
possible dynamics).
Prey and predators usually engage in somewhat coordi-
nated chase and escape interactions [49–54] that also allow
them to explore and profit from neighboring patches. It
is thus interesting to check whether, and to what extent,
the properties of the model, in particular in the coexis-
tence region, change in the presence of mobile individu-
als [43]. Chasing and escaping behaviors may be quite
complex depending on the physical and cognitive capabil-
ities of each individual and involve space and time corre-
lations between their displacements and changes in veloc-
ity [55]. Simple movement rules, if not completely ran-
dom, are likely to generate repeatable (and, because of
that, exploitable) patterns of behavior, while those involv-
ing higher levels of variability and complexity somehow
involve more advanced cognitive skills. By studying such
mobility patterns, one could get a better understanding
of how important those cognitive abilities are in defining
hunting strategies [1]. Moreover, these patterns are also
relevant for the demographic distribution of both preda-
tors and prey since the shuffling of strategies, depending
on how random the mobility is [56], may decrease the spa-
tial correlation and destroy local structures, changing the
spatial organization of prey and predators [47].
Several other extensions of this model are possible. For
simplicity, we assumed that the size of a group is constant
and homogeneous throughout the population. However,
it can also be considered as a dynamical parameter coe-
volving together with the collectivist trait. It is possible
to further explore the possibilities offered by the spatial
setup, for example, having heterogeneous parameters de-
pending on the landscape (due to an uneven distribution
of resources or to the variability of the species), what may
induce an optimal, intermediate level of collective forag-
ing corresponding to mixed strategies [57–59], sometimes
hunting in group, sometimes alone. Another important
question is how the size of the hunting groups respond to
an increase or to stochastic fluctuations in the size of a
swarm of prey (and vice-versa). Although we focus here
on the discrete, binary situation, it is also possible to have
larger patches with enough individuals to form more than
one group, such that the variables describing the local pop-
ulations may have multiple allowed values or even become
continuous. In addition, the dynamics considered here al-
lows neither a species with a smaller payoff to be the win-
ner nor the reintroduction of an already extinct species.
Removing such constraints (what can be considered a kind
of external noise) may be an effective way of taking into
account some of the missing ingredients of the model. It
would thus be interesting to see how robust the results are
in the presence of such noise. Finally, the short-range in-
teractions present in the model are not able to synchronize
well separated regions in the coexistence phase. On the
contrary, mean-field [37, 60] predicts a neutral fixed point
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in the coexistence region, around which the system oscil-
lates. By introducing a fraction of long-range connections
we expect such global oscillations to be restored [61, 62].
What is the threshold fraction of such interactions for hav-
ing global oscillations and how it depends on the parame-
ters of the model, along with the other points raised above,
are still open questions.
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